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ENTRY ANALYSIS UNDER THE 1992 HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES
JANUSZ A. ORDOVER*
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, released April 2, 1992,! devote substantially more
attention to the analysis of entry than did the 1984 Department ofJustice
Merger Guidelines they updated. The 1984 Guidelines allocated two
brief paragraphs to this important aspect of merger assessment and
relegated the economic analysis to two rather dense footnotes. The
heightened role for entry in the 1992 Guidelines reflects the growing
significance and sophistication of entry analysis in judicial decisions and
enforcement agency practice. This article describes the way the economic
analysis of the role of entry in the 1992 Merger Guidelines modifies and
extends that of the 1984 Guidelines.
I. UNCOMMITTED VS. COMMITTED ENTRY
The new Guidelines structure the analysis of entry by distinguishing
between two types of supply responses, which are termed "uncommitted"
and "committed" entry. Uncommitted entrants can engage in "hit and
run" entry. These are firms that would respond to a short-term profit
opportunity by producing in the relevant market, even were that profit
opportunity likely to disappear shortly after their entry. Committed en-
trants, in contrast, enter for the long haul. These firms are concerned
with long-run profit opportunities; they do not envision exiting the mar-
ket once they have entered, although their analysis of profitability of
entry does reflect their expectations about post-entry competition.'
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The terminology chosen by the Guidelines to distinguish between the
two types of supply responses emphasizes that a committed entrant makes
a long-term commitment to the relevant market in order to participate
in it. In contrast, an uncommitted entrant can quickly and reasonably
costlessly enter and exit; such a firm is not committed to the relevant
market. For this reason the two categories of entrants are demarcated
according to the irreversible investments (sunk expenditure) they must
make in order to sell in the relevant market, the time they will require to
produce and sell their output, and the costs they would bear in the event
of an exit. In particular, if the prospective entrants' sunk costs could not
be recouped within one year of the commencement of its supply re-
sponse, assuming a "small but significant and nontransitory" (SSNIP)
price increase above the currently prevailing price(s) in the relevant
market, hit-and-run entry is unlikely to be profitable and the firm would
not be considered an uncommitted entrant.
3
II. UNCOMMITTED ENTRY
The concept of an uncommitted entrant, new to the 1992 Guidelines,
generalizes the idea of "production substitution" from the 1984 Guide-
lines. Uncommitted entry includes traditional production substitutors-
firms that shift the use of existing assets to the relevant market from
the production of some other goods.'1 For example, if a firm currently
manufacturing metal mailboxes could quickly and cheaply switch its
metal stamping equipment to the production of hubcaps, the firm would
be treated as an uncommitted entrant into the hubcap product market.
The concept of uncommitted entry extends beyond production substi-
tution in two respects, however. First, uncommitted entry incorporates
the possibility that existing assets could be extended rapidly and cheaply
to the relevant market of concern.5 In some branded consumer products
industries, for example, the primary sunk expenditure facing a new
entrant could be creating a brand name and an associated reputation for
quality. In such a case, a firm able to extend an existing brand to a new
product would be an uncommitted entrant. In addition, the concept of
uncommitted entry incorporates the possibility that "de novo" entry could
be accomplished quickly with little sunk cost.'" If the assets required to
' 1992 Guidelines § 1.32. As a rough rule of thumb, if sunk costs of entry exceed 5% of
an entrant's likely annual revenues, this definitional test will not be met and the supply
response will be treated as committed.
1 1992 Guidelines § 1.321.
5 Id.
' 1992 Guidelines § 1.322.
[Vol. 61
ENTRY ANALYSIS UNDER GUIDELINES
do so are available to any number of entrepreneurs, entry is truly easy
and approximates the "contestable market" benchmark.'
The two types of supply responses distinguished in the 1992 Guide-
lines, uncommitted and committed entry, enter the analysis of an acquisi-
tion's likely effects on competition in distinct ways. Uncommitted entrants
are treated as market participants because they constrain current industry
pricing.' Once these firms are identified, they are assigned market shares.
An uncommitted entrant would normally be assigned a share based upon
the capacity it would devote to the relevant market were price to increase
by a SSNIP. 9 For a production substitutor, this calculation requires an
analysis of the profitability of uncommitted entry, taking into account
the forgone profit (opportunity cost) from diverting capacity away from
its prior use.'0 The production substitutor's market share thus turns on
its divertible capacity, which could be less than the capacity physically
available for production substitution when it would not be profitable to
reallocate capacity across markets in the event of a SSNIP. Because
uncommitted entrants are assigned market shares, their competitive sig-
nificance is taken into account in the first instance through their effect
on industry concentration, and in addition, later in the analysis, through
the analysis of their market conduct in the overall assessment of the likely
competitive effects of an acquisition."'
III. COMMITTED ENTRY
Committed entrants are treated differently by the Guidelines because
such firms are too far removed from actual entry to be assigned reason-
able market shares. The Guidelines instead adopt an analytical approach
that assesses whether committed entry would counteract or deter any
competitive problem that would otherwise be raised by the transaction.
A three-part test is employed: the supply-side force of committed entry
will ensure that market power could not result from a merger if and only
if that entry is timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character,
and scope.'2 Although the 1984 Guidelines mentioned many of the fac-
'See WilliamJ. BaumolJohn Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Contestable Markets: An Uprising
in the Theory of Industry Structure: Reply, 73 Am. EcoN. REv. 491 (1983).
s Other analytical approaches to merger analysis would take production substitution
into account in market definition. The Guidelines place the focus of market definition on
demand substitution, while accounting for supply responses in later steps of the analysis.
See 1992 Guidelines § 1.321 n.14.
See 1992 Guidelines § 1.41.
'0 This analysis will commonly be facilitated by the fact that the firms have existing
production operations, from which their costs and capacities can be determined.
" 1992 Guidelines § 2.0.
12 Id. § 3.0.
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tors relevant to determining whether this test is satisfied, the earlier
document did not provide either a fully articulated framework for under-
standing the relevance of these factors or a logically consistent explana-
tion of the way entry might solve a competitive problem resulting from
merger.
In general, entry will be considered timely only if significant market
impact can be achieved within two years of initial planning; 13 the two
year period is unchanged from the requirement of the 1984 Guidelines.
This horizon is not a tolerance level for short-term anticompetitive price
increases. Rather, the Guidelines recognize that entry that would take
effect in the distant future in response to the exercise of market power
is unlikely to deter an anticompetitive merger or deter the exercise of
that market power in the first instance. The 1992 Guidelines note one
exception to this rule of thumb: in a durable goods market in which
buyers may make investments to extend the useful life of existing prod-
ucts, this intertemporal substitution opportunity may imply that entry in
the more distant future would be sufficiently timely to deter competitive
harm.
Committed entry is considered likely under the 1992 Merger Guide-
lines if entry would be profitable in the post-merger environment. This
analysis is performed at premerger prices, thereby correcting a logical
inconsistency in the approach to entry of the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
The older document evaluated entry profitability assuming a SSNIP
lasting for a substantial period of time. This assumption failed to recog-
nize that an entrant who plans to remain in the relevant market evaluates
the profitability of entry at the long-run post-entry price, not at an
elevated price that might occur through the short-term exercise of market
power before entry competes away that market power. In addition, the
earlier assumption failed to recognize that the entrant would consider
the effect of its entry, and the concomitant addition to industry output,
on the market price.
The 1992 Merger Guidelines instead look to the premerger price in
evaluating the likelihood of entry. This focus recognizes first, that entry
will successfully solve a competitive problem resulting from merger only
if it returns the market price to the premerger level or below, and second,
that the committed entrant in for the long haul cares only about the long-
run price likely to prevail. Accordingly, committed entry is relevant to
merger analysis only if it would be profitable in the post-merger economic
environment assuming that the entrant would receive no more than the
premerger price.
": Id. § 3.2.
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Entry can be profitable at the premerger price in the post-entry eco-
nomic environment even if it was not profitable at the same price in the
pre-entry merger environment; this change in incentives is the focus of
likelihood analysis. If the merger has the feared anticompetitive effect,
industry output will decline, thereby creating additional potential sales
for an entrant beyond what had previously been available." The result
is to make entry more attractive than it had previously been. In short,
the change in market structure resulting from the acquisition creates a
gap in sales, raising the revenue potential for an entrant and softening
the competitive environment facing the prospective new competitor. The
Guidelines summarize this point by noting that a merger can create an
additional "sales opportunity" for an entrant.
15
The likelihood of committed entry is assessed by analyzing whether
the sales opportunities available to an entrant are sufficiently large as to
make entry profitable. To make this comparison, the Guidelines intro-
duce a concept termed "minimum viable scale" (MVS)." The MVS is the
smallest level of annual sales, made year after year, that would allow the
entrant to break even at premerger prices.' 7 In other words, MVS is the
smallest scale of production at which average costs equal the premerger
price. "' MVS will usually be expressed as a percentage of total sales in
the relevant market.
MVS will differ depending upon the production and distribution tech-
nology the entrant chooses to adopt. If the fixed costs of entry are large,
or the marginal costs of production are high at low levels of output, for
example, MVS will be relatively large. 9 For this reason, MVS must be
determined with reference to some "entry alternative," defined in the
1' If industry demand were perfectly inelastic, the additional sales opportunities created
by the competitive effect of concern would result entirely from the desire of customers to
buy at a lower price, and not from the fact that some customers would go unserved at the
higher price.
15 1992 Guidelines § 3.3.
Id.
'7 Minimum viable scale is not the same thing as minimum efficient scale. Minimum
efficient scale, defined as the smallest scale at which average costs are minimized, is affected
only by the way costs change with output. Minimum viable scale, in contrast, depends upon
the premerger price as well as on cost. (Both concepts may also depend on demand,
moreover, to the extent the time pattern of sales affects costs.)
" 1992 Guidelines § 3.3 n.29.
' Id. § 3.3 n.3 1. Thus, the MVS will be relatively high, and entry less likely, to the extent
the entrant's costs of variable inputs exceed the costs to incumbents because of difficulties in
obtaining inputs in short supply. If the entrant's cost disadvantage would make incumbents
respond aggressively to entry, that factor may reduce the available sales opportunities. To
the extent this cost disadvantage raises a foreclosure problem, moreover, it is also addressed
by the sufficiency analysis.
1992]
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Guidelines as the means a potential entrant would practically employ in
order to participate in the market.'( The Guidelines suggest that recent
examples of entry, whether successful or unsuccessful, might provide a
model from which the characteristics of a plausible entry alternative
could be identified.2 ' Because MVS depends upon firm average costs, its
calculation must take into account the opportunity cost of capital to the
firm. For a given probability of business failure, that opportunity cost
will be higher the greater the fraction of fixed costs that are sunk, causing
the loss of the sunk investments.
The likelihood of entry is determined by comparing the MVS-the
minimum fraction of the market an entrant must receive to break even
at premerger prices-with the sales opportunities available in the post-
merger environment. Those sales opportunities are set initially with ref-
erence to the feared output reduction should the competitive effect of
concern come to pass; the Guidelines instruct that this figure will typically
be estimated as 5 percent of total market sales. But this figure can be
adjusted upward to reflect long-term market growth, the entrant's ability
to divert sales' securely from incumbents through long-term contracts
with buyers, or any anticipated accommodation of entry by incumbents.
It can be adjusted downward as well, to reflect long-term market decline,
foreclosure of the entrant from a portion of the market by long-term
contracts between buyers and incumbent sellers, or the expectation of an
aggressive response by incumbents to entry.
If the minimum viable scale of entry exceeds the sales opportunities
available to an entrant, entry will not be likely. Under such circumstances,
the entrant will not enter because it cannot find a profitable scale. If it
enters at a small scale, no greater than the available sales opportunities,
its costs will exceed the premerger price. But if it enters at a large scale,
sufficient to break even at the premerger price, its output will exceed the
available sales opportunities, thereby depressing the price to a level below
the premerger level and making it impossible for the entrant to break
even.
Although the concepts of minimum viable scale and sales opportunities
are defined with care, the Guidelines do not contemplate that the govern-
' 1992 Guidelines § 3.1.
2l ld. Although past examples of entry are relevant to the computation of the MVS, MVS
cannot always be inferred from the minimum market share of successful past entrants; the
MVS is not a "survivorship test." Only by coincidence would past entrants, at the time they
made their entry decisions, anticipate receiving the premerger price as the long-run price
(other than in the unlikely circumstance of an industry characterized both by perfectly
competitive behavior and constant returns to scale). Moreover, past entrants may have
adopted entry alternatives that are no longer available or are more expensive today.
[Vol. 61
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ment or the merging parties attempt to estimate with mathematical preci-
sion the effect of factors that are unquantifiable. The Guidelines method-
ology seeks to structure the analysis of entry profitability in order to
highlight the key factors on which the likelihood analysis depends. A
spreadsheet analysis of MVS, for example, may show that the calculation
is sensitive to the level of fixed expenditures required to create a viable
brand name, and not sensitive to the assumed rate of return on capital.
But MVS can also be estimated, and compared with sales opportunities,
through the testimony of knowledgeable industry experts. Industry wit-
nesses who believe an entrant would need a minimum market share to
break even post-merger can be asked to explain why that share is so low
or high. Such witnesses can also discuss the extent of the price depression
that could be expected to follow entry at a particular scale. Whether the
evidence employed is quantitative or qualitative, the likelihood analysis
of the Merger Guidelines will organize that evidence in order to focus
the analysis of entry profitability on those factors on which profitability
most depends.
Finally, the Guidelines require that committed entry be sufficient.2"
Even if entry would occur quickly and would be profitable, it need not
be sufficient to cure the potential competitive problem raised by the
merger. For example, only one entrant may be able to employ an entry
alternative that has an MVS less than the available sales opportunities.
Unless that entrant would, following entry, find it profitable to expand
output beyond its minimum viable scale, entry may not be sufficient to
ensure that the post-entry price does not rise above the premerger price.
Such a situation could arise when incumbents control many of the assets
required for entry. A sufficiency question may also arise when the com-
petitive effect of concern is localized within the market, for example
when a merger between two sellers of differentiated products is thought
likely to lead to a unilateral increase in the price of one of the firm's
products. For entry to cure or deter this exercise of market power, the
entrant must introduce a product similar or close to the product whose
price, it is feared, will rise."
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1992 Merger Guidelines create an articulated economic frame-
work for analyzing the role of entry in merger analysis. The new analysis
Similarly, MVS cannot be inferred from premerger information on profits or price-cost
margins.
22 1992 Guidelines § 3.4.
23 As a matter of theory, the timeliness requirement can be thought of as an intertemporal
sufficiency requirement; entry will not be sufficient if it is delayed.
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calls for no facts that were not relevant to the analysis of ease of entry
under the 1984 Merger Guidelines. But the new framework provides a
logically consistent explanation of the way the prospect of entry may
deter or counteract possible harmful competitive effects of mergers, and
it organizes those facts in order to facilitate the analysis. In these respects,
the 1992 Guidelines advance beyond their predecessor.
